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Abstract 
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1. Introduction 
At least since the 1980s, governments around the world have implemented wide regulatory reforms 
that have reshaped network industries such as energy, telecommunications, and transport. The 
empirical evaluation of the societal impacts of these reforms1 is essential to guiding policymakers 
and regulators in the selection of the most appropriate measures. This process seems 
straightforward: reforms are desirable when they yield economic and social benefits that outweigh 
their costs (Coglianese, 2012). While this simple description is backed-up by a well-established 
theoretical literature in public economics (see Boadway, 2012 for a survey), empirical assessments 
of regulatory reforms by means of econometric analyses are complex (Jamasb and Pollit, 2001). 
One of the main difficulties is how to build accurate empirical proxies for regulatory reforms and 
use them to identify their causal effects on key economic outcomes (Arndt and Oman, 2006; Knack, 
2006). The recent controversy over the World Bank’s competitiveness rankings, brought to the 
media’s attention by former Chief Economist Paul Romer, exemplifies well the kind of criticisms to 
which extant proxies are subjected (Zumbrun and Talley, 2018). 
This paper summarizes these criticalities focusing on entry liberalization, privatization, 
unbundling, and independent regulation of the electricity, natural gas and telecommunications 
sectors. We surveyed 63 empirical analyses that rely on dichotomous or categorical variables to 
evaluate the effects of regulatory reforms across sectors, countries, and over time. These proxies for 
reform, such as the OECD “Indicators of regulation in energy, transport and communications” 
(ETCR) or the “ICT Regulatory Tracker”, recently released by the International Telecommunication 
Union, are based on a process that combines statistical data and subjective information from 
different sources (e.g., from surveys of business or experts). We discuss several issues involved in 
the measurement and assessment of regulatory reforms in network industries using categorical 
variables; next, taking stock of the literature, we provide recommendations to help researchers and 
                                                          
1 We use the term regulatory reforms to encompass any regulatory policy aiming to enhance the life of citizens and 
business; that is, any measure implemented by governments through legislative and non-legislative acts. In the literature, 
regulatory reforms are also referred to as structural reforms. See Section 2 for a more detailed discussion.  
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policymakers avoid methodological pitfalls and errors in interpreting empirical results. First, since 
categorical variables summarize a variety of data, aggregation biases can be reduced relying, as far 
as possible, on the most disaggregated index. Second, given that conceptual errors involved in the 
construction of reform proxies are to some extent inevitable, re-coding categorical indices into 
dichotomous variables might mitigate the impact of this issue. Third, we recommend using 
alternative proxies as robustness checks of the results and to facilitate cross-country comparisons. 
Fourth, properly handling the dynamics of the econometric specification is essential for capturing 
the forward-looking behavior of agents and to accurately describe the lags associated with the 
political process that leads to the implementation of reforms. Fifth, we review how to select 
appropriate control factors and valid instrumental variables to attenuate endogeneity problems that 
might undermine the identification of the effects of regulatory reforms. 
Empirical studies of the effects of regulatory reforms can be divided into two distinct groups 
depending on whether the reform proxy enters the econometric specification as a dependent variable 
or as an explanatory variable. The first class of models, which we do not analyze, is representative 
of the political economy literature on the historical determinants, success, and failure of reforms 
(see Obinger et al., 2016; Duso and Seldeslachts, 2010; Guerriero, 2013; Belloc et al., 2014, among 
many others). We focus on the strand of the literature where reform proxies are fed into regression 
models as explanatory variables with the aim of estimating their effects on various economic 
outcomes, ranging from prices to customers’ satisfaction. Studies that are related to our paper are 
Nicoletti and Pryor (2006), Jamasb et al. (2017), Parker and Kirkpatric (2012), and Pollit (2009a, 
2009b). We depart from previous surveys along two lines. First, we do not focus on economic 
outcomes (i.e., dependent variables), but mostly on regulatory reform indicators as explanatory 
variables. Second, we do not concentrate on a single sector or country, but on four different 
reforms: entry liberalization, privatization, unbundling, and the establishment of an independent 
regulatory authority in the electricity, natural gas and telecommunications sectors. In this way, we 
provide some guidelines for practitioners and academic researchers. 
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The rest of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 sets the conceptual framework and 
describes the difficulties of translating general definitions of regulatory reforms into empirical 
proxies; Section 3 discusses potential pitfalls and methodological issues related to the use of 
categorical proxies for regulatory reforms; Section 4 surveys the literature focusing on the 
measurement of different regulatory reforms with categorical proxies; Section 5 discusses how to 
selected appropriate control factors and valid instrumental variables to attenuate endogeneity 
problems; Section 6 concludes. 
 
 
2. Taking the theory of regulatory reforms to the data 
OECD (2012, p. 5) stated that regulatory policy aims at “(…) achieving government's objectives 
through the use of regulations, laws, and other instruments to deliver better economic and social 
outcomes and thus enhance the life of citizens and business.” This definition is broad enough to 
encompass most of the regulatory reforms implemented in network industries, including 
liberalization, privatization, unbundling, and the establishment of independent regulatory bodies. 
The OECD’s definition also shows that theoretical models belonging to the “Ramsey-Samuelson-
Guesnerie” tradition2 can hardly be used to analyze them. In fact, within this framework, regulatory 
reforms are expected to change a “vector of signals”, defined as variables affecting the behavior and 
welfare of individuals and firms, such as prices, rations, taxes, transfers, and shareholding rights 
(see e.g., Diamond and Mirrlees, 1971; Drèze and Stern, 1990, Gruber and Saez, 2002; Saez et al., 
2012; Barrell and Weale, 2009; Kosonen, 2015; Laubach, 2009). This framework is too narrow to 
represent a proper theoretical background for the array of reforms subsumed in the OECD’s 
definition of regulatory policy. 
In fact, regulatory reforms in network industries do not necessarily involve a marginal 
                                                          
2 See Ramsey (1927), Samuelson (1986) and Guesnerie (1977). 
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change to a vector of signals, such as tax rates or prices, nor an instantaneous variation in the social 
welfare function. Rather, they often imply a modification of the existing policy framework and are 
implemented with legislative packages that encompass a variety of instruments, such as primary 
laws, secondary regulations, subordinate rules, standards, administrative guidance and circulars, 
with complex interactions3 (OECD, 2010; Goldberg, 1976). 
While presenting a complete list of regulatory reforms is neither feasible, nor particularly 
informative, providing definitions of the four measures we analyze is useful to better illustrate the 
topics of the paper and the difficulties that emerge when these definitions need to be translated into 
quantitative or qualitative variables. 
 
2.1 Regulatory reforms in network industries: definitions 
We focus on liberalization, privatization, unbundling and the introduction of an independent 
regulatory body in electricity, natural gas and telecommunications sectors. Providing consistent 
definitions is not trivial in that these regulatory reforms are intertwined and their success depends 
on several factors including the order and the way in which they are implemented in different 
countries and sectors (e.g., Zhang et al., 2005). 
Finding a precise definition of “liberalization” is problematic. In fact, this term is used to 
encompass several measures aimed at spurring competition. For instance, privatization and the 
unbundling of the network core facilities are often viewed as part of the liberalization process (see 
e.g., Erdogdu, 2013; Pompei, 2013; Nepal et al., 2016). To avoid definitional problems, we adopt a 
narrow definition and equate the term liberalization to “entry liberalization”, defined as the removal 
of barriers to entry (i.e., any factors hindering entry in a market and hence representing an obstacle 
to competition). Privatization is more easily defined either as the transfer of property rights from the 
                                                          
3 In the case of the European Union, regulation of network services involves the adoption of both legislative and non-
legislative acts, the so-called “soft law”. Legislative acts (secondary law) comprise directives, regulations and decisions. 
Non-legislative acts include communications, green papers and white papers. “Soft laws” provide a correct interpretation 
of the primary and secondary laws. See Maresca (2013) and references therein. 
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public to the private sector or as the participation of the private sector in the management of public 
assets (Finger and Künneke, 2011), in this paper we focus on the first aspect only, the change of 
utility ownership. 
We exclude from liberalization those obstacles faced by the incumbent firms when they 
entered the market in the first place, such as the sunk costs of building the network’s core facilities. 
This exclusion allows for defining the concept of “unbundling” more precisely, although it remains 
intertwined with that of entry liberalization. The unbundling of network infrastructures aims at 
fostering competition in sectors where highly integrated firms operate (see Joskow, 1997). 
Integrated firms provide multiple services to exploit economies of scope that can derive from 
vertical integration (i.e., along different stages of the supply chain) or horizontal integration (i.e., 
the case of a multi-utility operating at a single stage of the production chain, but in different 
segments or sectors). Unbundling is thus the separation of the operation of network infrastructures 
from the stages of production and provision of services.4 A key dimension of structural reform is 
the degree of separation, from accounting to ownership separation. See Baldwin et al. (2013) for a 
discussion. 
Although liberalization, privatization, and unbundling have the common goal of fostering 
competition, their success hinges on the existence of an authority supervising and enforcing the 
rules necessary for their implementation. The establishment of an independent regulator is the 
fourth regulatory reform analyzed in our study. An independent regulatory authority (IRA) is an 
agency that independently from the interests of firms and of policymakers and other stakeholders 
can issue binding decisions and impose penalties, so to enforce the rules necessary for the actual 
implementation of reforms (see e.g., Armstrong and Sappington 2006; Bortolotti et al. 2013; Pollit. 
2009a; Larsen et al. 2006). The importance of the IRA for the effectiveness of entry liberalization, 
privatization, and unbundling crucially depends on the actual power that the political system 
                                                          
4 An alternative view adopted by some scholars is to reserve the term “unbundling” for measures aimed at regulating 
utilities that operate at the same level of the production chain, and use the term “restructuring” for the vertical separation of 
functions (e.g., generation, transmission and distribution). 
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delegates to it, and also by cultural norms, political and legal traditions, and other institutional 
features. Therefore, while capturing legal or de jure independence is quite easily achieved looking 
at the statute of the regulatory authority, measuring de facto independence is at least as important, 
but more involved (see Bortolotti et al. 2013; Edwards and Waverman, 2006). In both cases, the 
measurement process and the resulting indicators share the same features of those used for other 
regulatory proxies, notably the possibility of being expressed as categorical variables based on the 
aggregation of different sources of information. Furthermore, in the European Union, a related 
regulatory reform involves the institution of supra-national regulators and their interactions with 
national regulatory bodies.
 
The degree of centralization of regulatory policies at supra-national level 
is another example of a factor that could be measured with categorical variables and that is 
intricately related to the effectiveness of other regulatory reforms.5 
 
2.2 Databases for use in measuring regulatory reforms 
Given the complexity and interconnectedness of regulatory reforms, their quantitative assessment 
necessitates creating or resorting to artificial indicators that have no natural units of measure. A wide 
array of such indicators, which in most cases are categorical variables, have been used by scholars 
for their analyses (see e.g., Erdogdu, 2011a; Prati et al., 2013; Opolska, 2017; Koo et al., 2012; 
Grajek and Röller, 2012; Howard and Mazaheri, 2009; Nicoletti and Pryor, 2006). Data in these 
analyses have been compiled by international organizations, independent think tanks, and individual 
researchers. 
In this section, we discuss four prominent databases (namely, the ETCR, the MOM, the 
EURI, and the ICT Tracker) that are representative of what is available to researchers focusing on 
                                                          
5 Similarly, in the US the interaction between Federal and State level regulators is amenable to representation with such 
categorical variables. There is a substantial literature on decentralization or “fiscal federalism” (Bardhan, 2002 and Oates, 
1999, for a survey). As far as network industries are concerned, we could not find any empirical studies dealing with the 
institution of supra-national regulators and their interactions with national regulatory bodies, nor a database focusing on 
this issue. A theoretical contribution related to this topic is Kumkar (2002) who analyzes the centralization of the 
regulation of the electricity markets within the European Union. For this reason, we do not cover this issue in our analysis. 
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network industries. We stress that this list is not exhaustive6
 
and that our selection criteria were (i) 
their representativeness of the kind of empirical proxies for regulatory reforms discussed in this 
paper and (ii) the fact that they are widely used in the literature (see, among many others, Alesina et 
al., 2005; Brau et al., 2010; Belloc, 2013; Bacchiocchi et. al 2015; Faccio and Zingales, 2017; 
Copenhagen Economics 2005a,b; Edwards and Waverman, 2006; Montoya and Trillas, 2007; Ugur, 
2009). All in all, the following discussion highlights the complexity of quantitative measurement 
and the trade-offs between the closeness to the underlying theoretical definitions of reform and data 
availability. 
 
The OECD indicators of regulation in energy, transport, and communications (ETCR). The ETCR 
database collects information about regulatory structures and policies for OECD and some non-
OECD countries. ETCR indices have been widely used (e.g., Alesina et al., 2005; Brau et al., 2010; 
Belloc, 2013, among many others); however, we note that the database does not provide any 
information about the independence of the regulatory agencies. Therefore, in cases when this 
reform is of interest, ETCR data must be complemented with information from other sources. 
Information is collected with a questionnaire sent to governments and complemented with 
publicly available data to create annual time series starting in the mid-1970s and regularly updated. 
Questionnaires are made of closed questions that can either be answered with numerical values 
(e.g., the market share of the largest company in the sector), or by selecting from a set of pre-
specified answers (e.g., a question that can be answered with “yes” or “no”, such as whether 
unbundling of the local loop is required). Qualitative information is coded into quantitative 
measures and then all answers are normalized in a range from zero to six, where values near zero 
                                                          
6 Another example is the dataset compiled by the IBM Global Business Services and used to build the Rail Liberalizations 
Index (LIB Index), which provides information on the progress of entry liberalization in the European rail transport 
markets. 
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indicate fewer restrictions to competition.7 As shown in Figure 1, the ETCR index aggregates with 
equal weights indices for seven network industries: gas, electricity, air, rail, road transport, post and 
telecommunications. The structure of the ETCR database has evolved over time; here we refer to its 
latest release (Koske et al., 2015). For each sector, there are up to four sub-indices that cover 
different dimensions of the reforms: entry regulation, vertical separation, public ownership and 
market structure. One of the strengths of the ETCR database is that indicators are available for a 
very long horizon, making it suitable for panel-data analyses, see Figure 2. 
Although there are sector-specific items, some of the questions in the ETCR database can be 
easily linked with the concepts of entry liberalization (i.e., entry regulation), privatization (i.e., 
public ownership), and unbundling (i.e., vertical separation).8
 
As for electricity and natural gas, the 
ETCR database includes indices measuring the extent of privatization, entry liberalization and 
unbundling. As for telecommunications, only the first two regulatory reforms are tracked. For the 
natural gas sector, Figure 1 highlights that while the entry liberalization index can take on integer 
values from zero to six, the answers to the underlying questions have at most three alternatives or, 
in some cases, are based on re-scaled percentages. As we can see, the three questions in the top 
panel of Figure 1 are concerned with the quantification of barriers to entry. In the case of electricity, 
the first question is the same, but then there is also a second item about the existence of a liberalized 
wholesale market and a third item that investigates under which conditions consumers are free to 
choose their electricity supplier. In this case, we notice that only the first and third questions are 
tightly linked with the notion of barriers to entry. For telecommunications, there are three questions 
that can be answered choosing among three alternatives and that focus on the existence of barriers 
to entry in different segments of the market (i.e., trunk, international, and mobile). Privatization is 
investigated focusing only on the percentage of the government's ownership, while nothing is said 
                                                          
7 Consider the question: “What is the market share of the largest company in the sector?” The methodology assigns a score 
of zero if the share is smaller than 50%, three if it is between 50% and 90% and six if it is greater than 90%. 
8 We notice that items belonging to the “market structure” section can be either the result of regulatory reforms or elements 
used to track them. For this reason and since the underlying questions do not clearly represent any of the four regulatory 
reforms we study, from now on we disregard this part of the ETCR database. 
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about public vs. private management. Moreover, in the case of the electricity sector, there is a single 
question that does not discriminate about different segments (e.g., generation, transmission and 
distribution are all in the same question). The possible answers represent either re-scaled 
percentages or arbitrary codifications of percentages or qualitative items (e.g., “private” set to 0, 
“mostly private” set to 1.5, “mixed” equal to 3, and so on). Unbundling and the degree of vertical 
separation are measured with similar techniques. 
 
Market Opening Milestones (MOM) database. The MOM database was developed by Copenhagen 
Economics (2005a, 2005b) for the European Commission and was used among others by Brau et al. 
(2010) and Ugur (2009). It collects information on several regulatory reforms in electricity, gas, 
telecommunications, transport, and postal service implemented by the EU-15 Member States over 
the 1990-2004 period. Since then it has not been further updated. The database tracks a variety of 
regulatory reform, referred to as Market Opening Milestones (MOMs), whose nature and number 
varies across sectors, but that can be easily associated with those we are interested in. For instance, 
in the case of the electricity sector, Copenhagen Economics focuses on the portion of the retail 
market that is open for free choice, third-party access regimes for the distribution and transmission 
networks, ownership of generation, and the extent of unbundling of the transmission and the 
distribution networks. As for the natural gas sector, the MOMs under scrutiny are the degree of 
unbundling of transmission and distribution system operators, ownership of supply companies, 
third-party access to the transmission grid, distribution grid and storage capacity, and degree of free 
choice of supplier.9
 
For the telecommunications sector, relevant MOMs are the ownership of 
networks, third-party access regimes, and the extent of customer choice. 
Indices in the MOM database have a zero value if the regulatory reform has yet to be 
implemented and a positive score, greater than zero and at most equal to one, after it has been 
                                                          
9 Additional MOMs for the electricity sector are: tariff structure and congestion mechanisms wholesale market model. 
Further MOMs for the natural gas sector are: tariff structure in transmission pricing and regulation of end-user price 
11  
implemented. The score assignment is based on expert estimates of the importance of the MOM for 
market opening and as such is highly subjective. The information collected in the MOM database is 
used to produce an overall indicator, the Market Opening Index, which tracks each sector’s progress 
towards market opening. Despite its name, the Market Opening Index does not relate uniquely with 
entry liberalization; in fact, its components can be used to construct ETCR-like proxies for entry 
liberalization, privatization, and unbundling.10 Therefore the Market Opening Index is closer in 
spirit to the ETCR broad index for a given sector. One key difference is the aggregation scheme, 
which in this case does not use equal weights, but involves a highly subjective process based on 
expert evaluation of the relative importance of different MOM. Like its underlying components also 
the aggregate index goes from zero to one where, in the parlance of Copenhagen Economics, a unit 
value denotes “full market opening”. See Figure 3. 
 
The European Union Regulatory Institutions (EURI) database. The EURI database and the 
associated EURI Independence Index, due to Edwards (2004) and used by Montoya and Trillas 
(2007) and Edwards and Waverman (2006), focus on regulatory independence in the 
telecommunications sectors of 15 EU Member States over the 1997-2003 period. The underlying 
data are sourced from reports of the European Commission and of the OECD. The aim of these 
indicators is to gauge the extent to which the IRA is independent of the country’s government. 
Different aspects of regulatory independence are investigated focusing on powers, jurisdiction, 
composition, funding mechanisms, availability of resources, and other key features of the statute of 
                                                          
10 Interestingly, the MOM database allows for the reconstruction of indicators that in some cases are similar to those in the 
ETCR database. An entry liberalization index is obtained by summing the MOMs referring to third-party access and to the 
degree of free choice of supplier. A proxy for privatization can be produced focusing on the network ownership MOM. A 
correlation analysis of the indices in the MOM and ETCR databases was provided in the working paper version of Brau et 
al. (2010) who showed that the two set of indices are significantly correlated. 
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NRAs. These data are collected for twelve items11 and are summarized with dichotomous or 
categorical variables rescaled to take on at most four (integer or non-integer) values in the unit 
interval. See Figure 4. 
Building on these data, the EURI Independence Index is an unweighted sum of the twelve 
mentioned items (Edwards and Waverman, 2006). The resulting index ranges continuously from 0 
to 12, with higher values corresponding to greater regulatory independence. Besides issues 
associated with the construction of the index, the EURI database has other limitations: it focuses 
only on a single sector, it is not regularly updated, and it does not collect information about the 
interaction between supra-national authorities and IRAs. Another limitation is that the EURI 
Independence index captures only de jure independence, while it tells nothing about factors 
contributing to de facto independence. 
 
The ICT Regulatory Tracker (ICTRT). The ICTRT, recently released by the International 
Telecommunication Union, covers about 190 countries over the 2007-2016 period. It relies on 
quantitative and qualitative information to build a set of 50 indicators that are grouped into four 
“clusters”. See Figure 5. The first and second clusters (10 and 15 indicators, respectively) are 
concerned with regulatory independence and summarize the main features and the mandate of the 
regulatory authority.12 The third cluster (11 indicators) encompasses a broader set of regulatory 
issues that are beyond the scope of our analysis; lastly, the 14 indices belonging to the fourth cluster 
track the level of competition in the ICT sector and as such are more related to the effects of 
                                                          
11 These are: whether the IRA is (i) single or multi-sector; (ii) a single or multi-member body; (iii) funded by government 
appropriations or industry fees and consumer levies; (iv) reports only to the executive government or also to the 
legislature; (v) has adequate powers regarding interconnection issues; (vi) shares its regulatory functions with the 
government; (vii) whether the legislature is involved in IRA member appointment; (viii) whether IRA member terms of 
appointment are guaranteed, allowing them to exercise regulatory power without concern for political factors that might 
influence their continued tenure; (ix) whether IRA member terms are renewable; whether IRA (x) staff and (xi) resources 
are adequate; and (xii) whether the IRA has been in operation for at least 2 years since its establishment. 
12 Examples of indicators belonging to the first cluster include variables accounting for the existence of separate 
telecommunications/ICT regulator; autonomy in decision-making; enforcement power; and a requirement for public 
consultations before decisions. Indicators in the second cluster (“Regulatory Mandate”) provide information about who is 
in charge of regulating, for example, the service quality, licensing, interconnection rates and price regulation, radio 
frequency allocation and assignment, broadcasting and internet content and so on. 
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specific measures, rather than with the measurement of the phase of the reform process. 
Each of the 50 indicators is given a score of 0, 1, or 2 and then they are aggregated with 
equal weights within each cluster to build four broad indices, which are in turn added up (again, 
with equal weights) to yield an overall indicator. This overall index ranges between 0 and 100, 
where higher values correspond to a more advanced regulatory environment. Countries are then 
classified into four categories: those with regulated public monopolies (0 ≤ score < 40); those that 
have implemented basic reform (40 ≤ score < 70); those enabling investment, innovation and 
access, stimulating competition in service and content delivery, and consumer protection (70 ≤ 
score < 85); and those with integrated regulation (85 ≤ score ≤ 100). These definitions and 
aggregation process are discretionary and identify both the effect and the status of the reform. 
Lastly, similarly to the EURI Index, the ICT Tracker focuses only on the telecommunications sector 
and on de jure independence, but it has the advantage of being constantly updated and covering a 
larger sample of countries. Recent studies relying on this database include Faccio and Zingales 
(2017), Ortiz et al. (2017) and Mailu and Waema (2016). 
 
 
3. Issues related to categorical proxies for regulatory reforms 
As highlighted in the overview of databases, most regulatory reform proxies share two common 
features: they are compiled by transforming quantitative and qualitative information into 
normalized scores and are aggregated with a bottom-up approach. If score assignment and 
aggregation are meaningful and consistent over time and across countries, the effects and intensity 
of reforms could be easily tracked, as illustrated in Figures 2 and 3. However, building such scoring 
systems and aggregating them with bottom-up approaches involves several issues that can be 
grouped into three main categories: (i) conceptual errors, (ii) discretization, and (iii) aggregation 
errors. These three issues cause a broader class of empirical problems that goes under the header of 
measurement error. This fourth issue is related with the discussion in Section 5, where we analyze 
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how researchers have dealt with this and other factors that can cause endogeneity problems and 
hence undermine the identification of the effects of regulatory reforms. 
 
3.1 Conceptual errors 
Conceptual errors arise when the regulatory reform proxy does not clearly relate to a narrow 
theoretical description of the measure the researcher is interested to study. Moreover, the analysis is 
prone to interpretational and identification problems when the variable designed as a reform 
indicator might also be the outcome of some macroeconomic shock. For instance, the market share 
of the largest electricity generator is part of the policy and can be used as an empirical proxy when 
the regulator forces the incumbent to divest generation capacity. By comparison, if the market share 
has changed in response to an exogenous technological shock that altered the optimal production 
plan, not only for the incumbent but also for other firms the sector, the validity of the reform proxy 
is questionable. In this case, the technological shock is a confounding factor that causes an omitted 
variable bias and hence ultimately affects the evidence in favor or against the reform. Another way 
of introducing a conceptual error is to rely on regulatory reform indicators that are not able to fully 
capture the actual extent of a regulatory reform. A case in point is the distinction between de jure 
and de facto regulatory independence. 
 
3.2 Scale discretization 
Most regulatory reform proxies, such as those in the ETCR or MOM database, have a 
multidimensional and often discrete scale. The reason for relying on discretized variables is the lack 
of a common unit of measure. Discretization has many drawbacks (Rucker et al., 2015). First, 
potentially useful variability is discarded and second, this loss of variability reduces the precision of 
in-sample and out-of-sample predictions. When the reform process is summarized with a 
dichotomous variable, there might be a substantial reduction in statistical power, which increases 
the chance of both Type-I (false positive) and Type-II error (false negative). Moreover, Lien and 
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Balakrishnan (2005) showed that the dichotomization of the independent variable reduces 
goodness-of-fit and may increase or decrease the regression slope. Dichotomization also leads to 
interpretational issues. In fact, using a dummy variable within a panel regression to measure the 
existence of barriers to entry, implies that market opening would be of the same magnitude in all 
countries. Lastly, discretization may be arbitrary, because the data provide no guidance for defining 
the scoring systems. 
 
3.3 Aggregation 
No valid economic criteria are usually available to guide the aggregation of different categorical 
variables using bottom-up approaches. With no a priori information on the relative importance of 
each proxy, equal weights are often assigned to different aspects of reforms and upper-level proxies 
are simple averages or sums of the lower-level variables. This may bias estimates, affect inference, 
and influence the evaluation of reforms since aggregate scores depend on arbitrarily selected equal 
weights. Besides these problems, the use of aggregate reform measures in place of sub-indices leads 
to a loss of information because the effects resulting from distinct aspects of the regulation are not 
separately identified. 
 
3.4 Measurement error 
Measurement error (ME) identifies any deviation from the true value of a variable that arises in the 
definitional or measurement stage (Asher, 1974) and therefore subsumes all the issues discussed so 
far. Mis-measurement is likely to be particularly severe in the case of regulatory reform proxies 
since they rely on an array of non-standard data sources such as media coverage, legal and non-
legal acts, and surveys that are then processed by expert judgment. In this case, misreporting by 
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subjects, coding and other errors are likely to inflate ME.13 Moreover, even in the presence of 
correctly measured variables, what we called “conceptual errors” are another source of ME. In fact, 
observed data often do not correspond to the exact theoretical concept the analyst is interested in. 
Another relevant issue comes from the fact that long time series are typically more precisely 
measured in the present than in the past. A case in point is the ETCR database, as its extension 
backward in time is expected to create a systematic measurement error, given that the quality of 
data is probably correlated with time. In fact, the reconstruction of data and smaller coverage for the 
early part of the sample makes data in most recent years more accurate than in the past. We turn 
now to a discussion of the empirical literature on regulatory reforms having in mind the issues 
identified above. 
 
 
4. Categorical proxies for regulatory reforms: a survey of the literature 
Earlier literature on the impact of regulatory reforms on network industries considered their impact 
on a wide array of dependent variables. Consumer prices are the most straightforward, important 
and widely used proxy for welfare changes induced by the regulatory reforms (Price and Hancock, 
1998, for the theoretical background; Bacchiocchi et al. 2011; Bacchiocchi et al. 2015; Brau et al. 
2010; Erdogdu 2011b; Estache et. al. 2006; Fiorio and Florio, 2013; Growitsch and Stronzik, 2014; 
Hattori and Tsutsui, 2004; Hyland, 2016; Nagayama, 2007, 2009; Steiner, 2001; Wallsten, 2001, 
among others, for empirical analyses). An alternative approach is to rely on consumers’ satisfaction 
surveys to measure perceived welfare changes (see e.g., Clifton et al., 2010, 2011, 2014; 
Bacchiocchi et al. 2011; Ferrari et al., 2011; Fiorio et al. 2013). 
Further dependent variables considered in this strand of the literature are aggregate output 
                                                          
13 In the benchmark case of classical ME, least squares estimates will be downward biased (or “attenuated”) and 
inconsistent. In the literature on regulatory reforms, since indicators are often categorical or dummy variables and models 
can also be non-linear, classical ME is rarely a good benchmark. See the surveys by Angrist and Krueger (1999), Bound et 
al. (2001), and Hausman (2001) for a comprehensive discussion. 
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(e.g., Copenhagen Economics, 2005a; Prati et al., 2013), productivity (e.g., Pompei, 2013; Borghi et 
al. 2016), investment (e.g., Alesina et al. 2005; Gugler et al. 2013; Nardi, 2012; Grajek and Roller, 
2012; Cambini and Rondi, 2010), quality of service (e.g., Zhang et al., 2005, 2008; Polemis, 2016; 
Polemis and Stengos, 2017; Koo et al. 2012; Briglauer, 2014, 2015) and emissions of pollutants 
(e.g., Asane-Otoo, 2016; Clò et al., 2017). 
Our aim here is not to summarize the conclusions of the literature on the merits of the 
regulatory reforms, but rather to highlight if and how researchers have acknowledged the existence 
of measurement and interpretational issues. For this reason, our analysis, which includes studies 
published between 2001 and 2018, does not focus on a specific timeframe, set of countries or on a 
given economic outcome. 
 
4.1 Aggregate indices of regulatory reforms 
Instead of analyzing exclusively specific measures, many studies rely on indicators that aggregate 
different regulatory reforms.14
 
A case in point is Alesina et al. (2005), who used the aggregate 
ETCR index. This indicator collapses in a single number all the information relating with 
privatization, unbundling and entry liberalization. Similarly, Ugur (2009) and Copenhagen 
Economics (2005a,b) relied on the aggregate Market Opening Index sourced from the MOM 
database. While this approach provides a summary of the impact of regulatory reforms in network 
industries, it does not allow for distinguishing the measures that drive the estimated effect and is 
clearly subject to aggregation biases due to the use of equal or subjective weights. Relying on equal 
weights implicitly means that all regulatory reforms move a given outcome in the same direction 
and with the same magnitude. Moreover, time-invariant weights convey the idea that neither the 
phase of the reform process (e.g., legal or ownership unbundling) nor the sequencing of different 
measures matter. Lastly, some of the studies that focus on aggregate reform indicators equate them 
                                                          
14 See, among many others, Alesina (2005); Bacchiocchi et al. (2011); Bacchiocchi et al. (2015); Erdogdu (2011a, b, 
2013); Fiorio and Florio (2013); Grajek and Roller (2012); Polemis and Stengos (2017); Pompei (2013); Prati et al. (2013); 
Zhang et al. (2008); Copenhagen Economics (2005); Ugur (2009). 
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to all-encompassing terms such as “deregulation” or “liberalization” (see e.g., Erdogdu, 2013; 
Pompei, 2013; Nepal et al., 2016). Terms that are vague or not tightly linked to theoretical 
definitions, or that lack theoretical definition at all, confound the interpretation of results. 
 
4.2 Entry liberalization 
The extent to which barriers to entry have been removed is measured by aggregating information on 
different issues, such as the terms and conditions of third-party access and the share of the retail 
market that is open to consumer choice.15 Aggregate indicators of entry liberalization might 
introduce a bias in their estimated effects for two reasons. First, different aspects of this regulatory 
reform are aggregated with subjective weights and, second, this aggregation process induces a loss 
of information. Both problems can be either attenuated, by relying on data-reduction techniques or 
completely avoided using only lower-level indicators. Data-reduction techniques, such as Principal 
Component Analysis, have been successfully implemented to calculate weights and synthetic 
reform proxies in many settings (e.g., Ferrari and Manzi, 2014; Poggi and Florio, 2010). While 
these methods may yield a weighting scheme, they do not subsume any economic theory, leave 
almost no control to the analyst, and are severely affected by the presence of outlying observations. 
An alternative is to check the robustness of results to different weighting schemes with randomly 
drawing weights (Koske et al., 2015). Yet another option, implemented by Fiorio and Florio (2013) 
and Steiner (2001), is to include the items composing the ETCR entry liberalization index directly 
in their empirical specifications to disentangle their relative importance. When the aim is to study 
the effects of entry liberalizations on customer satisfaction (Bacchiocchi et al., 2011) or energy 
deprivation (Poggi and Florio, 2010), researchers estimate non-linear models, such as probit or logit 
specifications. When moving from linear to non-linear models the effects of classical or non-
                                                          
15 Studies using proxies for entry liberalizations are, among the others, Bacchiocchi et al. (2015); Brau et al. (2010); 
Fiorio and Florio (2013); Growitsch and Stronzik (2014); Hattori and Tsustsui (2004); Steiner (2001); Alesina et al. 
(2005); Asane-Otoo (2016); Botasso and Conti (2010); Gugler et al. (2013); Kim et al. (2012); Pompei (2013); Polemis 
(2016). 
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classical ME are harder to evaluate and to address.16 
 
4.3 Privatization 
Variables relating with the transfer of shares of ownership from the public to the private sector have 
been made available in several databases or constructed by individual researchers. Privatization 
indices are built starting from a continuous variable bounded in the 0-100 interval, where we 
interpret 100 to mean that all the shares are owned by the government. Scholars source these 
variables from different databases including the ETCR17 or directly construct them from company 
ownership data (e.g., Borghi et al. 2016; Bortolotti et al. 2013; Opolska, 2017). These proxies are 
then used either directly (e.g., Alesina et al., 2005; Bacchiocchi et al., 2011; Growitsch and Stronzik 
2014; Hattori and Tsutsui, 2004; Steiner, 2001) or after transforming them into a dummy variable 
(e.g., Bacchiocchi et al. 2015; Asane-Otoo, 2016; Howard and Mazaheri 2009; Zhang et al. 2005). 
While this transformation is in principle legitimate and is done to carry out before-after 
comparisons (e.g., to identify price changes due to the privatization) it has some drawbacks. A 
dummy does not allow for measuring the extent and magnitude of privatization and measurement 
error (classical or not) in the underlying ownership variable would introduce non-classical 
measurement error in the dummy variable. In fact, a dichotomous variable can only be misclassified 
in one of two directions: a true “zero” classified as “one” or a true “one” classified as “zero”. In a 
bivariate linear regression setting, a mis-measured dummy variable still leads to an attenuation bias, 
but generalizations of these results to other settings with more than one regressor is not possible18 
(Card, 1996). A related problem is the inclusion of squared ownership variables to capture nonlinear 
                                                          
16 In fact, while instrumental variable estimation often provides a solution to the ME problem in linear models, it does not 
deliver consistent estimates in a nonlinear regression framework. See Bound et al. (2001), Hausman (2001) and Schennach 
(2016) for a survey of ME in nonlinear models. 
17 See, among the others, Bacchiocchi et al. (2011); Bacchiocchi et al. (2015); Brau et al. (2010); Fiorio and Florio (2013); 
Growitsch and Stronzik (2014); Polemis (2016); Alesina et al. (2005); Asane-Otoo (2016); Belloc et al. (2013); Clò et al. 
(2017); Pompei (2013). 
18 A way to deal with the issue of misclassification of the reform variable is to rely on the bound approach of Bollinger 
(1996). 
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relations between privatizations and the outcome variable of interest. Polynomial transformations 
inflate the size of the attenuation bias coming from classical measurement errors (Griliches and 
Ringstad, 1970). Alesina et al. (2005) used the square of the ETCR privatization index, as well as 
the squares of more aggregate regulatory reform proxies, to model their nonlinear effects on 
investment. Erdogdu (2011a) followed a similar approach to study the impact of regulatory reforms, 
proxied by a composite reform index, in the electricity sector. 
The measurement of privatizations, much like that of any other regulatory reforms, is also 
subject to aggregation biases. The ETCR database, as well as the data used in other papers, such as 
Hyland (2016) and Nagayama (2007, 2009), are sometimes available at a different level of 
aggregation. For the natural gas sector, the ETCR database provides ownership information about 
the largest firm in the production, transmission and distribution segments. In this case, using the 
disaggregated indices could reduce aggregation biases related to the discretionary approach of 
relying on equal weights. An alternative solution would be to collect ownership data for all firms 
operating in different sectors. These data can then be used directly in empirical analyses as in 
Borghi et al. (2016) or combined with other information, such as the firms’ share of sector revenue, 
to construct sector indices based on time-varying aggregation weights. Such an aggregation scheme 
would put more weight on firms with larger market shares. 
 
4.4 Unbundling 
The degree of separation of the operation of network infrastructures from the stages of production 
and provision of services is typically measured with a categorical variable with an ordering going 
from full vertical integration, to complete unbundling. Since this is a relatively simplistic, but 
consistent way of identifying the sequence of legislative acts that triggers the unbundling process, 
categorical variables representative of this process have been used in several papers, including 
Bacchiocchi et al. (2015); Brau et al. (2010); Fiorio and Florio (2012); Growitsch and Stronzik 
(2014); Hattori and Tsutsui (2004); Hyland (2016); Steiner (2001); Asane-Otoo (2016); Gugler et 
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al. (2013); Nardi (2012); Nepal et al. (2016); Pompei (2013). In this case, the arbitrary 
discretization of the phases of the vertical separation process (e.g., the ETCR database assigns three 
scores: 0 to ownership separation, 3 to legal and/or accounting separation and 6 fully integrated 
segments of the natural gas sector) is likely to generate further issues because ordinal data are 
treated as cardinal variables. To reduce the distortions that this cardinalization might introduce, 
researchers have proposed two approaches. As suggested by Fiorio and Florio (2011), one might 
determine with extensive robustness checks whether results critically depend on the cardinalization 
adopted. Alternatively, Bacchiocchi et al. (2015), Growitsch and Stronzik (2014), Zhang et al. 
(2005) and Nagayama (2007), among others, suggested collapsing scores into a dichotomous 
variable, or aggregating them in very wide brackets. There is a clear trade-off between statistical 
variability and discretization issues: the dichotomization dramatically reduces the cardinalization 
error, but also leads to information losses. Moreover, the use of dummy variables is potentially 
subject to other issues. In the case of a semi-logarithmic model, the percentage change in y due to a 
discrete change in D from 0 to 1 is in fact given by p = 100 × (exp{c} – 1); however, using the 
Ordinary Least Squares (OLS) estimate of c, denoted as ?̂?, yields a biased estimator for p. A better 
solution is to rely on ?̂? = 100 × [exp{?̂? – 0.5 ?̂?(?̂?)} -1 ], where ?̂?(?̂?) is the OLS estimate of the 
variance of ?̂? (Kennedy, 1981). Among the surveyed studies, only Nepal et al. (2016), analyzing the 
unbundling of the New Zealand electricity market, addressed this issue as suggested. 
Lastly, the study of unbundling might also be affected by the level of aggregation of the 
reform indicator. For instance, any aggregation bias might be attenuated considering disaggregated 
indices (see e.g., Hyland, 2016) in place of an aggregate unbundling indicator that does not 
distinguish between generation, transmission, distribution, and the retail sale of electricity. 
 
4.5 Independent Regulation 
Papers focusing on this regulatory reform are rooted in the strand of the literature dealing with 
central bank independence that also relies on similar categorical variables to measure the autonomy 
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of the monetary policy authority (see Acemoglu et al., 2008; Alesina and Summers, 1993; 
Cukierman, 1992; Grilli et al. 1991, among many others). Studies investigating the impact of the 
establishment of an independent regulatory authority are based either on dichotomous variables, 
that simply measure the existence of a separate regulator (e.g., Fink et al. 2003; Wallsten 2001, 
2002; Gutierrez and Berg, 2000; Ros 2003; Zhang et al. 2005; 2008; Nagayama 2007; Erdogdu 
2011a; Estache et al. 2002, 2006; Bortolotti et al. 2013), or on more sophisticated aggregated 
indicators (e.g., Gutierrez, 2003; Edwards and Waverman, 2006; Bauer, 2003), that include also 
other characteristics of the statute and mandate of the regulators (e.g., funding sources and financial 
autonomy, the ability of the government to overrule the regulators’ decisions). The introduction of 
IRAs, much like any reforms of regulatory institutions, is expected to have complex effects on the 
effectiveness of other measures enforced to enhance competition in network industries. In 
regression models, indices measuring the independence of regulator are often interacted with 
proxies for entry liberalizations (e.g., Polemis, 2016), unbundling (e.g., Nagayama, 2007; Erdogdu 
2011a) and privatizations (e.g., Bauer, 2003; Edwards and Waverman, 2006; Fink et al., 2002; 
Wallsten, 2001; Estache et al., 2002; Bortolotti et al., 2013). A related topic is that of the 
sequencing of different regulatory reforms. For instance, Zhang et al. (2005) and Wallsten (2002) 
showed that whether an IRA existed or not before privatization is key for their ability to enhance 
competition. Lastly, institutional quality might also affect the performance of independent 
regulatory authorities. This topic has been dealt with in different ways. Estache et al. (2006) 
interacted the regulatory independence indicator with a corruption and an investment risk index that 
are used as indices of the quality of institutions. Alternatively, Bortolotti et al. (2013) included 
proxies for the quality of institutions directly among controls, without interactions with the 
regulatory independence index. Lastly, Prati et al. (2013) split their sample of countries into 
quartiles based on the quality of their institutional environment, measured by the strength of 
constraints on the executive power and the risk of expropriation. 
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5. Identifying the effects of regulatory reforms 
From an econometric standpoint, the empirical analyses reviewed in the previous section can all be 
framed in the setting of the generalized linear (GLM): 
g[E(y | x)] = x′y  LEF (1) 
where y is the outcome of interest, which can be a cross-sectional, time-series or panel variable, x 
denotes the set of explanatory variables including also the reform proxy, is the vector of unknown 
parameters, g(.) is called link function and LEF indicates a density belonging to a linear exponential 
family. Examples of LEF densities are the Bernoulli distribution for binary data, the Poisson and 
negative binomial distributions for count data, and the normal distribution for continuous data 
(Gourieroux et al., 1984). Combining different link functions and LEF densities yields a wide array 
of models that encompass all the specifications commonly used in the econometric literature about 
regulatory reforms in network industries19 (McCullagh and Nelder, 1989). Two classes of models 
are commonly used in this literature. Linear models, when the dependent variable is continuous, 
such as log-prices, log-productivity and GDP growth (see e.g., Hyland 2016, Hattori and Tsutsui, 
2014; Prati et al., 2013, among many others). Models for limited dependent variables, when the 
outcome variable is a dummy, such as consumers’ satisfaction or energy deprivation (see e.g., 
Bacchiocchi et al., 2011; Ferrari et al., 2011; Fiorio and Florio, 2011; Clifton et al., 2011, 2014; 
Poggi and Florio, 2010). 
Within the GLM framework the interpretation of estimated coefficients, from a purely 
statistical point of view, is relatively straightforward. However, economic interpretation requires 
                                                          
19 For illustrative purposes, let E(y | x) and g(). The role of the link function g(.) is to map E(y | x) to = x′. 
When g(.) is the identity function and y is a continuous normally distributed variable, such as (the log of) the electricity 
price, we get the linear regression model: E(y | x) = x′. When g(.) is the logit function (inverse of the standard Normal 
cumulative distribution) and y is a binary variable with Bernoulli distribution, such as consumers’ satisfaction (e.g., y = 
1 corresponds to “satisfied”, y = 0 means “not satisfied”), we obtain the Logit (Probit) model. Moreover as already 
stated Equation (1) is suitable also for analyses based on panel data. Under the assumption that the link function g(.) is 
the identity function and that the outcome variable is normally distributed, we get a linear one-way error component 
model for panel data: yit = + xit′+ uit, for i = 1,…, N and t = 1,…,T. Where uit = i + it is the error term, i is the 
unobservable individual-specific effect that accounts for the heterogeneity among statistical units, it is the remainder 
disturbance. 
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more caution. Different issues may indeed undermine the identification of the causal effects of 
regulatory reforms on the dependent variable of interest. Measurement error, already discussed in 
Sections 3 and 4, is just one of the causes of endogeneity problems, that might also arise because of 
omitted variables and simultaneity. In this section, we briefly review how researchers have 
addressed the identification problem. We focus on the selection of appropriate control factors and 
valid instrumental variables in panel-data analyses that represent the vast majority of the studies we 
survey. Both these choices are critical to take into account possible endogeneity problems. 
 
5.1 On the choice of control variables 
Virtually all empirical specifications omit some relevant, but possibly unobservable explanatory 
variables. In these cases, the error term of the regression will pick up the influence of such 
confounding factors and hence omitted variable bias is likely. In the ideal case, both the outcome 
variable and the reform proxy are correctly measured. Omitting other relevant variables because 
they might be measured with error would simply substitute the bias due to measurement error with 
an “omitted variable bias”. Moreover, McCallum (1972) showed that using a proxy for a latent 
variable will induce a smaller asymptotic bias than simply dropping the variable from the model. 
The proper treatment of unobserved heterogeneity or the inclusion of a suitable set of controls 
might help mitigate such bias. Either fixed or random effects are used to account for unobserved 
heterogeneity among statistical units (see e.g., Growitsch and Stronzik, 2014; Hattori and Tsustsui, 
2004; Gugler et al., 2013; Erdogdu 2011a, 2013; Koo et al. 2012; Agiakloglou and Polemis, 2018). 
Although the statistical units that are analyzed obviously determine whether firm, individual, sector, 
or country fixed effects are included in the regression model, dummy variables accounting for 
heterogeneity across countries are included in virtually all of the studies we survey. 
While country fixed effects capture a wide array of unobserved characteristics that are fixed 
in time, researchers sometimes include time-varying explanatory variables accounting for 
institutional features and the quality of the political system (i.e., measures of impartiality, 
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bureaucratic quality, corruption), judicial and labour market indicators, and economic indicators 
measuring the involvement of the government in the economy (see Bortolotti et al., 2013; Grajek 
and Roller, 2012; Gugler et al., 2013; Koo et al. 2012; Wallsten, 2001). Two examples are the 
Fraser index of economic freedom (see e.g., Polemis, 2016; Polemis and Stengos, 2017; Zhang et 
al., 2018; Agiakloglou and Polemis, 2018; Gwartney et al., 2012) and measures of investors’ 
protection (Bortolotti et al, 2013). Alternatively, interactions between regulatory reform proxies and 
indicators of institutional quality could be useful to understand how the effectiveness of reforms 
varies with countries’ institutional quality (see e.g., Borghi et al., 2016; Estache et al., 2006). 
Since economic relations are not static in nature, an omitted variable problem might arise 
also when the effect of lagged dependent variables is neglected or, more generally, in the presence 
of serial correlation. Panel data exhibit two sources of correlation over time. The first, unobserved 
heterogeneity, arises because the same individual is observed over multiple time periods. The 
second, true state dependence, occurs when correlation over time is due to the causal mechanism 
explaining the fact that a variable is determined by its own lagged values; leading examples are 
prices or aggregate investment (e.g., Brau et al. 2010, Alesina et al. 2005). In case of path 
dependence, the most straightforward way to introduce some dynamics is to rely on an 
autoregressive distributed lag model and employ a GMM estimator to face the endogeneity issues 
that may arise when including lagged values of the dependent variable among the regressors (see 
Prati et al., 2013; Alesina et al., 2005; Guegler et al., 2013; Pompei, 2013; Polemis, 2016; Grajek 
and Roller, 2012; Briglauer, 2015; Growitsch and Stronzik, 2014). However, including a lagged 
dependent variable may lead to underestimating some of the effects of the other explanatory 
variables (see Howard and Mazaheri, 2009). 
Even static models may, at least implicitly, consider the time dimension. For instance, Steiner 
(2001) and Hattori and Tsutsui (2004), who focused on electricity prices, used variables that track 
years needed to complete liberalization and privatization processes to capture expectations of the 
impact of reforms on prices. An alternative is including variables counting the number of years 
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during which reforms have entered into force (Howard and Mazaheri, 2009). The sequencing of 
reforms may also be relevant to determine their effectiveness. This is studied in Zhang et al. (2005), 
who included a set of dummy variables denoting whether competition was introduced before 
privatization and whether regulation was implemented before privatization of the electricity 
generation sector. 
In addition to modeling unobserved heterogeneity with fixed or random effects and dealing 
with the dynamics, most analyses also include a set of variables to control for confounding factors 
determined by the nature of the dependent variable. For instance, when analyzing the effects of 
regulatory reforms on prices, natural candidates are demand- and supply-side controls. Demand-
side factors include proxies for the size of the market (see Bacchiocchi et al. 2011; Hyland, 2016; 
Erdogdu, 2011b; Wallsten, 2001; Erdogdu, 2011b), the price and the demand for substitutes (see 
e.g., Growitsh and Stronzik, 2014 and Bacchiocchi et al., 2011). Supply-side drivers proxy the 
change in unit costs, that in turn are correlated with input prices and, in the longer-run, also with 
technological shifts. For example, in the case of electricity production, unit costs depend on the 
price of energy inputs such natural gas, coal, nuclear, hydropower, solar, and wind, as well as on 
production and distribution losses (see Bacchiocchi et al. 2015; Nagayama, 2007). Finally, 
including a time trend would be useful to capture technological progress (see Polemis 2016; 
Polemis and Stengos, 2017).20 
 
 
                                                          
20 This list is clearly not exhaustive. For instance, when explaining investment levels it is crucial to account for the real 
interest rate to control for the cost of capital (see e.g., Alesina et al, 2005; Gugler et al. 2013; Cambini and Rondi, 
2010); environmental outcomes are likely affected by the environmental regulation enforced (Clò et al, 2017; Asane-
Otoo, 2016); the adoption of a given ICT technology can be influenced by consumers’ characteristics (Briglauer, 2014; 
Howard and Mazaheri, 2009); among the determinants of R&D expenditure it is important to include firm-level 
characteristics (see Kim et al., 2012) and other macroeconomic variables (see Erdogdu, 2013). When dealing with 
customer satisfaction demographic characteristics are good candidates (see Clifton et al. 2011; Fiorio and Florio, 2011) 
are crucial determinants to be considered; the underlying objective economic variable (i.e., the actual price level), if 
available, would be also useful control variables (see Fiorio and Florio, 2011). 
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5.2 Finding valid instrumental variables 
While not simple, the search for valid instruments is at the core of several research papers. In fact, 
regulatory reforms are often endogenously determined, since factors influencing changes in the 
outcome variable of interest may also affect the likelihood that policymakers implement them, as 
well as the timing and sequence in which they are enforced. For example, it may be the case that, at 
least initially, regulatory reforms lead to higher prices, or that countries with higher electricity 
prices are more likely to reform their electricity markets (see Hyland, 2016; Nagayama, 2009). The 
choice of giving up the control of state-owned enterprises to private investors may be determined 
either by the government need to raise money selling highly profitable public utilities (Cambini and 
Rondi, 2010) or by the willingness to sell off very inefficient and unprofitable entities. Therefore, 
the post-reform performance also depends on the pre-reform efficiency and profits that in turn have 
determined the government’s decision to privatize. Similarly, when analyzing the effects of the 
establishment of an independent regulator, it should be kept in mind that governments might have 
an incentive to set up a regulatory agency in sectors where profitability is expected to be higher 
(Bortolotti et al., 2013). Even if several studies recognize the existence of this complex interplay 
between regulatory reforms and the outcome variable of interest, not all of them try to overcome the 
reverse causality problem (see e.g., Wallsten, 2001). 
The simplest solution to avoid possible simultaneity biases is to lag the reform proxy as well 
as other explanatory variables that might lead to reverse causality issues (see Bacchiocchi et al. 
2011; Bortolotti et al. 2013). A relatively more sophisticated approach is to make use of 
instrumental variables. Valid instrumental variables must be uncorrelated with the error term of the 
regression and must be correlated with the endogenous variable of interest. Given the difficulty of 
finding valid instruments, dynamic panel data techniques, such as the Arellano and Bond (1991) 
estimator are often used to deal with possible endogeneity problems. Lagged values of the 
dependent variable and of the regressors are used as instruments after first differencing the 
regression model (see Hyland, 2016; Alesina et al., 2005; Polemis, 2016). 
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Alternatively, political economy variables, such as the degree of political fragmentation, are 
usually considered valid instruments. Political institutions are likely to affect the reform process, 
such as the size of the stake retained in public utilities or the extent of government residual 
regulatory power (Bortolotti et al. 2013) but should be uncorrelated with the dependent variable and 
hence solve simultaneity issues. Studies using political economy variables as instruments for 
reform indicators are Nagayama (2009), Grajek and Roller (2012), Cambini and Rondi (2010, 2017), 
Gual and Trillas (2003), Grajek and Roller (2012) and Bortolotti et al. (2013). However, Edward and 
Waverman (2006) in their analysis of regulatory independence criticized the validity of these 
instruments, arguing that it is hard to claim they are uncorrelated with sector or firm performance. 
They relied on an alternative approach, originally developed by Evans and Kessides (1993), to 
identify a valid instrument for the index of regulatory independence whose exogeneity with respect 
to regulated interconnection rates paid by entrants to incumbents might be questionable. They 
created a regulatory reform index based on country rankings according to the EURI-I index. The 
expectation is that while the implementation of reforms enhancing regulatory independence will be 
affected by high interconnection rates, it is unlikely that changes in these rates will affect the ranking 
of countries. 
 
6. Concluding remarks 
We reviewed the use of categorical variables in econometric studies of regulatory reforms in 
selected network industries. This is the first time such a review has been provided in the empirical 
regulatory economics literature. We started from the distinction between the theory of reform in the 
Ramsey-Samuelson-Guesnerie tradition and the problem of evaluating regulatory reform when it 
cannot be read as a marginal change to a specific economic signal. This distinction clearly matters 
to empirical analysis as the assessment of reform is prone to both methodological and 
interpretational errors. The interpretation of estimated coefficients is also affected because reform is 
not usually a marginal change in the variable of interest, but rather a transition from one policy 
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regime to another. 
The bottom line of our analysis is that while moving from the theory to the analysis of 
reform might be challenging, empirical evaluation is encouraged. In fact, the quantitative 
measurement of how social welfare responds to a change of circumstances, such as those implied by 
a reform, is not only at the core of applied welfare economics, but also essential because evaluation 
of outcomes informs policymakers about both success and failure, and alerts them to the need for 
adjustments to regulation consistent with policy goals (OECD, 2010, p. 9). Put simply, “evidence 
on the outcomes of regulatory policies should help policymakers design regulatory measures that 
work better” (Parker and Kirkpatrick, 2012), Therefore, although extant proxies have shortcomings, 
they are nevertheless the best quantitative information available to researchers interested in 
empirically analyzing the impact of reforms and as such, they can be used to deepen our knowledge 
of the effectiveness of different economic policies. In this review, we have shown that while 
researchers have proposed different solutions to attenuate endogeneity problems that might 
undermine the identification of the effects of regulatory reforms, further research is needed to 
address the methodological issues we discussed. We have also offered our practical advice on how 
to deal with some of the unavoidable implications of collapsing regulatory reforms into proxies 
based on categorical variables derived from the available databases. 
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Figure 1. Structure of the OECD’s Energy, Transport and Communications Regulation (ETCR) database. 
 
Notes: The underlying questionnaire for the gas sector is shown. Numbers are weights assigned to sectors, topics and questions and used for 
aggregation purposes. 
Source: authors’ elaboration using data in Koske et al. (2015). 
 
 
 
Figure 2. Trends of ECTR reform indicators in EU-15 countries for the natural gas sector, 1975 – 2013. 
 
 
Notes: each panel shows one of the indicators of Energy, Transport and Communications Regulation (ETCR), for individual EU15 countries (dots), 
the median value of the indicator (line) and the interquartile range, (IQR, shaded area). ECTR reform indicators score from 0 to 6. 
Source: authors’ calculation on data sourced from the ETCR database (Koske et al., 2015). 
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Figure 3. Market Opening Indices for the electricity, gas and telecommunications industries, 1990-2003 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Note: The figure shows the Market Opening Index for the electricity, gas and telecommunications sectors, highlighting the time path of market opening. 
The indices may take on values from zero to one. A higher index value indicates that market opening is more advanced. 
Source: Copenhagen Economics (2005a), p. 12 
 Figure 4. European Union Regulatory Institutions - Independence (EURI-I) Index Elements (1998 and 2003) 
 
Notes: the figure shows the 12 institutional elements measured by the EURI Database. Each element is measured as either a categorical or dummy variable on a 0-1 scale. The EURI-I index represents the sum of these 12 
measures. It can therefore range continuously from 0 to 12, with higher values corresponding to greater regulatory independence. Although the minimum and maximum in the sample considered by Edwards and 
Waverman (2006) are 1.5 and 10.25, respectively. 
Source: Edwards and Waverman (2006), p.44. 
 Figure 5. Structure of the ICT Regulatory Tracker Database 
 
Notes: the ITC Regulatory Tracker index is the sum of the 50 questions shown in the figure with equal weights. 
Source: authors’ elaboration based on information available at https://www.itu.int 
